A State Building Without Recognition, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
by Tozun Bahcheli, University of Western Ontario

Like Antarcticland www.antarcticland.org, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is an example of a State without recognition.

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was established in 1983. What I would like to do is to take stock of a quarter century of existence of this de facto state, evaluate its achievements and future prospects. My presentation will consist of three parts:
(i) the state building activities of Turkish Cypriots and the advances made in consolidating their democracy,
(ii) the recognition issue, viz. the great difficulties the TRNC has faced in achieving acceptance by other states, with the notable exception of Turkey,
(iii) the evolving relations between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, and the impact of these on Turkish Cypriot identity.
1. Achieving self-government and cultivating democracy 1983 marks the beginning of TRNC but it is 1974 that really marks the beginning of
Turkish Cypriot self-government and state formation. In fact, the antecedents of Turkish Cypriot government go back further, to 1963, when power-sharing between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots came to an end and a civil war began on the island. A “Turkish Cypriot Provisional Administration” was created in 1967. Notwithstanding
these developments, 1974 is by far the most important turning point in Turkish Cypriot, indeed the island’s recent history. Following a Greek coup intended to unite the island with Greece, Turkey sent its military to Cyprus during the summer of 1974. In the ensuing war, the island was partitioned into two: a Turkish Cypriotadministered
entity emerged in the north, while Greek Cypriot-controlled and
internationally-recognized Republic of Cyprus administered the southern part of the island. In the following year (1975), the Turkish Cypriot administration declared the ‘Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’, signalling that they were creating the Turkish part of an envisaged federation.
1974 marks the first time that Turkish Cypriots were physically concentrated in one area and hence better positioned to govern themselves than had previously been the case, when they were divided up among scattered enclaves. Their security was underwritten by the Turkish military and their economy subsidized by the Turkish treasury. In short order, the Turkish Cypriot government began to function like that many states in the international community, maintaining effective control over its territory and providing a myriad of services to its population. At the same time, this new micro-state began to develop and consolidate democratic institutions and practices.
One of the signs of the budding democracy in north Cyprus was the proliferation of political parties. Prior to 1974, party activity and dissent had been discouraged on the grounds that the Greek Cypriot threat required a united front. But with security no longer a matter of paramount concern, political activity flourished after 1974, with
parties of the left challenging the nationalist parties of the right, and Turkey’s role in Turkish-Cypriot society and politics being debated openly, as never before. At the same time, a vigorous civil society appeared. Whatever outsiders may have thought of the level of Turkish Cypriot democracy, no less a figure than the former Prime
Minister of Turkey, Bulent Ecevit, praised the TRNC for being more democratic than Turkey.
The idea behind declaring the TRNC in 1983 was to strengthen the Turkish Cypriot position in the United Nations-sponsored intercommunal talks. A referendum was conducted on the constitution of the new state and endorsed by a wide margin.
Although Turkish Cypriots hoped for recognition, the TRNC did not necessarily represent a serious bid for separate statehood, and on that understanding Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash continued to participate in UN-sponsored negotiations over the reunification of Cyprus as a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation. However, by the early 1990s, it became apparent that the TRNC had taken on a life of its own.
Increasingly, as the TRNC matured from constitutional novelty to a familiar system of internal self-governance, the Turkish-Cypriot position shifted to one of asserting the right of self-determination.
2. The recognition issue: Irrespective of the approval that the TRNC won in Turkish circles and elsewhere for its democratic credentials, this made no difference to most of the outside world. No other state than Turkey has extended recognition to the TRNC. Thus, like other de
facto states, the TRNC has existed as a pariah in the international community. In addition, a draconian economic embargo and boycott initiated by the Greek Cypriot government, has seriously hindered economic growth in the TRNC. Turkish Cypriots have thus faced great difficulties in achieving sustained economic growth and a viable
economy. As a consequence, Turkish Cypriots have had rely heavily on Turkish economic assistance. It is unconscionable that the economic embargo on the TRNC continues and hampers economic development there. It is especially disappointing that the European Union has failed to keep its promise to Turkish Cypriots to remove the economic embargo in the aftermath of their endorsement of the Annan plan in 2004.
Certainly the TRNC is luckier than many de facto states in having a kin state that is prepared to provide economic, security, and diplomatic help on a very considerable scale. Even as Turkish Cypriots pay a high economic price due to the economic embargo imposed on them unfairly by the outside world, generous Turkish subsidies has raised Turkish Cypriot incomes to much higher levels than that of most other de facto states, and higher than Turkey itself.
If international recognition was forthcoming, the TRNC would become less dependent on Turkey, and that would be welcome to most Turkish Cypriots. But the chances of that remain slim. Turkish Cypriot expectations for recognition were raised in the aftermath of the dissolution of the USSR, with five Turkich states (Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kirgizistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan) emerging as independent republics, but none have extended recognition to the TRNC.
The curious status of north Cyprus vis-à-vis the EU has important implications concerning its standing in the international community. It is useful to recall that the EU admitted Cyprus as a member in 2004, but the Greek Cypriot rejection of the UN settlement plan (popularly known as the Annan plan) has meant that Turkish Cypriots
were left out of the EU. Brussels made clear to Turkish Cypriots during the Annan plan negotiations that the only way they could join the EU would be by giving up the TRNC and reunifying with Greek Cypriots in a federation. That realization helped sway the tide in favour of reunification and abandoning the cause of sovereign statehood, as the Yes vote of Turkish Cypriots showed in the 2004 referendum on the UN plan. It is widely expected that another UN-sponsored initiative will commence later in 2008 to settle the Cyprus issue and reunify the island. If a new settlement blueprint was to emerge and become endorsed by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, it
will inevitably mean the end of the TRNC.
3. Evolving Relations with Turkey - In the meantime, the fortunes of the TRNC will be closely tied to that of its Turkish motherland, as it has for many years. Turkey is the indispensable patron, a fact widely
acknowledged by Turkish Cypriots. Each year July 20 1974 (when the Turkish military arrived and made Turkish Cypriot self-government possible) is commemorated in the TRNC as a day of liberation. However, while their sense of gratitude to Turkey is evident and regularly expressed, most Turkish Cypriots prefer to chart their own course. A number of developments have taken place in recent years that indicate the strengthening of a distinct Turkish Cypriot identity and desire to be “masters in their own house”:
• A new generation of Turkish Cypriots view such events as the war of 1974 asbelonging to a distant past, while they have their eyes fixed on the future. It is no wonder that proportionately many more young Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of the Annan plan that was designed to bring north Cyprus into the EU. The future they envision is not a future of dependency on the motherland but rather one of integration
with the wider world and particularly with Europe, which they believe would bring inestimable benefits.
• The arrival of thousands of immigrants from Turkey (who constitute an estimated quarter of the population in the TRNC) has led to fears among many Turkish Cypriots that unchecked immigration from Turkey would threaten the “Cypriot” character of their society. Although not nearly as adamant as Greek Cypriots about Anatolian settlers many Turkish Cypriots have favoured putting limits on such immigration.
• It is no less important a development that power in the TRNC has been transferred to a new generation of political leaders who have been keen on reducing Turkish Cypriot reliance on Turkey. These were the same leaders who led the successful ‘Yes’ campaign during the 2004 referendum, effectively ending the long political rule of veteran Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash who championed close ties with Turkey.
When Kosovo recently declared its independence, TRNC president Mehmet Ali Talat was among the first leaders to congratulate the Kosovar leadership. However, neither Talat nor most Turkish Cypriots are under any illusion that Kosovo is setting a precedent and that the TRNC might be recognized in the foreseeable future. Indeed, Talat’s sights are set on the forthcoming UN initiative to try and settle the Cyprus
issue and bring about the island’s reunification. During its quarter century existence, the TRNC can rightly be proud of a number of
achievements: it has established a functional state, has attained a level of democracy comparable with European democracies, and has achieved a respectable level of prosperity with a per capita income that, with the important exception of Taiwan, is considerably higher than that of other de facto states. And yet, such has been the cold
shouldering of the international community and the severity of its isolation, that its citizens will face the same dilemma as they did in 2004, in the event that a new settlement plan and new referendum takes place: they can either opt for the TRNC and an indefinite isolation, or join the club of Europe as part of a federal Cyprus.
In today's world, it seems that almost any topic is open for debate. While I was gathering facts for this article, I was quite surprised to find some of the issues I thought were settled are actually still being openly discussed.
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